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Abstract—The automatic identification system (AIS) reports
vessels’ static and dynamic information, which are essential for
maritime traffic situation awareness. However, AIS transponders
can be switched off to hide suspicious activities, such as illegal
fishing, or piracy. Therefore, this paper uses real world AIS
data to analyze the possibility of successful detection of various
anomalies in the maritime domain. We propose a multi-class arti-
ficial neural network (ANN)-based anomaly detection framework
to classify intentional and non-intentional AIS on-off switching
anomalies. The multi-class anomaly framework captures AIS
message dropouts due to various reasons, e.g., channel effects or
intentional one for carrying illegal activities. We extract position,
speed, course and timing information from real world AIS data,
and use them to train a 2-class (normal and anomaly) and a
3-class (normal, power outage and anomaly) anomaly detection
models. Our results show that the models achieve around 99.9%
overall accuracy, and are able to classify a test sample in the
order of microseconds.
I. INTRODUCTION
Maritime security is of utmost importance today as over
90% international trade as well as thousands of passengers
around the world are carried over sea [1]. Maritime trans-
port poses significant challenges, natural as well as human-
induced, e.g., tough and unpredictable environment, collision,
illegal fishing, smuggling, pollution, and piracy. Nowadays,
the automatic identification system (AIS) has become an
essential part of maritime traffic situation awareness. Vessels
equipped with AIS transponders report their positions, which
are based on the global navigation satellite system (GNSS),
their navigational status, as well as other voyage related infor-
mation. This information can be used in collision-avoidance
mechanism, tracking of vessels, detecting unusual trajectories
of vessels, etc. However, AIS transponders can be switched off
to hide suspicious activities, such as illegal fishing, or piracy.
Therefore, it is essential to use real world AIS data in order
to analyze the possibility of successful detection of various
anomalies in the maritime domain.
Anomaly detection in maritime traffic has attracted re-
searchers to apply various statistical and machine learning so-
lutions [1], [2]. Statistical solutions, such as extended Kalman
filter and particle filter, have been used to reconstruct trajectory
of vessels [3]. When the estimated and real trajectories differ
more than a predefined threshold, those events are categorized
as an anomalous behavior. Bayesian network was applied for
tackling missing values (anomalies) in a dataset for prediction
and classification purposes [4]. A hidden Markov model was
utilized to detect AIS on-off switching (OOS) anomaly with
the consideration of transmission channel characteristics [5].
Machine learning (ML) algorithms, such as artificial neural
network (ANN), support vector machine (SVM), long short-
term memory (LSTM), on the other hand, have been shown
to perform better than statistical methods for prediction and
classification problems in general. Recently, [6] proposed a
one-class SVM-based anomaly detection framework that takes
AIS data as well as received signal strength into consideration
for analyzing AIS OOS anomaly. [7] used a random forest
ML algorithm to classify vessels using AIS data streams.
A long-short-term-memory (LSTM) algorithm was used in
[8] to reconstruct vessels’ trajectories. Although the use of
ML models for anomaly detection has just started recently,
ANN, which can learn complex fitting functions and has been
shown promising as compared to other ML techniques, has not
been applied to deal with the multi-class intentional and non-
intentional AIS OOS anomaly yet. A multi-class model is vital
to capture AIS message dropouts due to various reasons, for
example, channel effects (e.g., power outage) or intentional
(for illegal activities). We expect more AIS dropouts, when
vessels move away from the AIS receiver. Thus, it is important
to distinguish between the intentional and natural AIS OOS.
The natural dropouts of AIS messages can be identified using
the vessels distance from an AIS receiver where the weak
received signal strength may result in loss of messages.
In this paper, we propose an ANN-based anomaly detection
framework to detect an AIS OOS anomaly. We use real-
world AIS messages to train our multi-class anomaly detection
framework, and test on further real AIS data. More in detail,
we extract a four-dimensional (4-D) feature vector containing
latitude, longitude, speed, and course information from each
AIS message transmitted by vessels. After resampling the
received AIS messages, we train the ANN models with data
samples containing one or more 4-D feature vectors within an
observation period. A data sample is labeled as an anomaly
when it has consecutive AIS dropouts more than a predefined
threshold. First we train and test a 2-class model consisting
of normal and anomaly samples. Our results show that the
2-class AIS OOS model can detect anomaly correctly with
an overall accuracy of nearly 100%. In order to distinguish
intentional AIS OOS anomaly from the AIS dropouts due
to weak received signal strength, we add power outage as
another class. For this purpose we add the distance as an
extra feature, calculated between the position of vessels and a
receiver station, to classify power outage samples based on a
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predefined AIS transmission range. Upon training the 3-class
anomaly model with this additional feature, the model achieves
around 99.9% overall accuracy, and that too in a reasonable
time of a few microseconds per sample.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
briefly describes the AIS and its usefulness in the anomaly
detection framework. Section III presents a neural network
model for anomaly detection and data preparation steps for
the models. We evaluate the performance of the models in
Section IV, and conclude the paper in Section V.
II. AIS AND ANOMALY DETECTION
In this section, we first briefly describe the AIS, and then
we explain our ML-aided framework that can be used to
detect various maritime anomalies, including the AIS on-off
switching, using the AIS data.
A. AIS for Maritime Security
Today most ships, excluding very small non-passenger ones
(less than 300 gross tons), are mandated to be equipped with
AIS transponders by the international maritime organization,
and follow the Safety Of Life At Sea (SOLAS) convention,
2002, in order to ensure security and safety of maritime
navigation [9]. AIS transponders mainly use two dedicated
wavelengths in a very-high frequency (VHF) band to transmit
AIS data: 161.975MHz and 162.025MHz. Among different
classes of transponders, Class A is of particular interest in
this paper as most of the ships are legally required to install
it. The AIS transmitted data are received by GNSS antennas.
Both terrestrial as well as satellite links have been used for
the AIS transmission. Note that a terrestrial link is limited by
the curvature of the Earth, roughly 40 nautical miles, in the
normal propagation condition.
AIS transponders can transmit 27 types of messages, but
most used messages are of type position reports (1, 2, 3, and
5). An AIS position report message transmitted by a vessel at
regular interval contains mainly vessel identification number
(MMSI), longitude (lon), latitude (lat), speed over ground
(SOG), course over ground (COG), heading, rotation rate,
timestamp, and other voyage related information. The position
report messages, which are our focus, are sent every 2 to 10
seconds depending on a vessel’s speed, and every 3 minutes for
anchored or moored vessels. The Class A AIS transponders use
Self Organized Time Division Multiple Access (SOTDMA)
protocol to transmit AIS information in self- managed time
slots. The positional and navigational information make AIS
data a treasure for detecting anomaly behavior of vessels,
predicting trajectory, avoiding collisions, among others. In this
paper, we store position report messages from vessels with
speed larger than 3 knots, and remove data corresponding
to anchored or moored vessels, by checking their speed and
navigational status. We use them to train our ML model in the
anomaly detection framework, which is described next.
B. ML-Assisted Anomaly Detection Framework
Figure 1 depicts our anomaly detection framework, which
uses AIS messages from vessels as input data. Upon reception
of an AIS message through the base station (BS), a Knowledge
Base is used to store past AIS information in order to train
ML-assisted anomaly detector. The trained ML model is saved
and updated regularly in the Knowledge Base for detecting
anomalies on live AIS data traffic. The anomaly detector has
the following roles to play.
• Data preprocessing. The AIS transmission is generally
affected by propagation phenomena, including transmis-
sion frequencies, power, antenna gains, and most im-
portantly intentional switching on and off of AIS on-
board transponders [10]. Therefore, at the receiver AIS
messages containing dynamic report about vessels’ po-
sition, speed, course, and other voyage details could be
missing or erroneous when time sampled at an expected
interval (e.g., every 2 seconds for moving vessels with
speed greater than 23 knots). The missing AIS messages
are also called dropouts in the literature [6]. For a
sequential data analysis, we can use either dummy or
interpolated data to replace missing messages. The er-
roneous/corrupted AIS messages must be dealt carefully
and is out of scope of this paper.
• Feature extraction. Depending on the type of anomaly, a
set of features can be extracted from each AIS message
for the training and testing of an anomaly detector. In
this paper, for AIS on-off switching, we consider mainly
position, COG and SOG features of a vessel.
• Anomaly test. The anomaly detector can use a suitable
supervised or unsupervised ML algorithm for training and
testing purposes. In our case we use a supervised ANN
model to detect whether the received data over a time is
anomalous or not. The ANN model is trained with data
collected over time in the Knowledge Base, and used for
online anomaly detection purposes.
• Decision making. As various factors impact the reception
of AIS messages, a decision making block can further
post process the result obtain from an anomaly test. It
can decide and differentiate whether the detected anomaly
is natural, e.g., power outage, or an intentional one, for
example, illegal fishing or piracy.
III. ML FRAMEWORK AND DATA PREPARATION
A. Artificial Neural Network
We use a three-layer ANN model, shown in Figure 2, which
has an input layer with n nodes, a hidden layer with m nodes,
and an output layer with K nodes. The weight of the link
between an input node i and a hidden node j is denoted as
wij , i = 1, . . . , n, j = 1, . . . ,m, and the link-weight between
the hidden node j and an output node corresponding to a class
k, k = 1, 2, . . . ,K is denoted as wjk. The output of a hidden
node j is expressed as
hj = f
(
n∑
i=1
wijxi − bj
)
, j = 1, 2, . . . ,m. (1)
where bj is the threshold of the hidden layer node j, and
f(·) is an activation function that transforms its input on
Fig. 1: An anomaly detection framework.
Fig. 2: Artificial neural network classifier model.
a non-linear output function. In the hidden layer, we use a
Rectified Linear Unit (ReLU) as an activation function due to
its efficient computation and better gradient propagation. The
output of the ReLU function given an input x is max(0, x).
In the output layer, the activation function is Softmax, which
is expressed as
yˆk = f(zk) =
ezk∑K
j=1 e
zj
·
The Softmax function calculates the probabilities of each
target class k = 1, 2, . . . ,K over all possible target classes.
Finally, error is calculated between the actual output per class,
yk and the estimated output yˆk using the cross entropy error
or loss function as given below.
e = −
K∑
k=1
yk log(yˆk)
Each training epoch transfers the signal information from
input layer to the output layer, and computes the error. A
regularization term is generally added to the loss function
to avoid overfitting of training data. Although there is no
analytical formula which can provide the optimum weights
and biases to get minimum error, an iterative backpropagation
algorithm [11] propagates the error backwards to adjust the
weights of links and biases. Among the many optimizers
available today for ANN, we selected a well-known Adam
optimizer which finds the (local) minimum of the objective
(error) function making use of its gradient. The process is
repeated until the error is below a defined threshold or the
number of epochs is reached to its maximum defined limit.
In general, we can design the ANN with one or more hidden
layers and neurons. It is important to mention here that for our
experiment increasing the number of hidden layers increases
the learning time complexity, but accuracy.
B. Data Preparation
We use the AIS data collected at the Rostock port. After
decoding the AIS messages, we extract trajectories of vessels
from AIS data using their unique MMSIs, and associated
longitude and latitude information. Figure 3 depicts trajectories
of vessels that have been extracted from the received AIS
data. It also shows the considered boundary for transmission
reach under the normal condition , i.e., distance around 40
nautical miles, from Rostock. We can see that there are many
missing data samples. Moreover, the AIS transmission rate
vary between 2 and 10 seconds for moving vessels with speed
more than 3 knots. Therefore, for each trajectory we resample
the data every τ = 2 seconds and place the real data according
to their timestamps, and missing data by a dummy value. We
denote a sequence of time-sampled data within an observation
period T = 120 seconds as an input data sample to the ANN,
which is represented by Xti = {xti , xti+τ , . . . , xti+(T−1)τ},
where the first data xti is a real 4-dimensional vector derived
from a reported AIS message of a vessel at time ti.
xti ≡ {lat, lon, COG, SOG}
On the other hand, xti+τ could be a real 4-D feature vector
received at time ti+τ or dummy values representing a missing
data. For example, with τ = 2 seconds, and T = 120,
we have an input data sample of size T/τ = 60. We use
a sliding window to create data samples from each vessel
as {Xti , Xti+1 , . . .}, where ti is the time instance at which
ith AIS message was received. To begin with the AIS on-
off detection, each data sequence is labeled by one of two
classes: normal or anomaly. Later we add another subclass
of anomaly, which is non-intentional, i.e., AIS dropouts due
to power outages. For the 2-class anomaly detection model,
we label a data sample as an anomaly if it has more than
X% continuous AIS dropouts following the first AIS data
in a sample. As the number of anomaly samples is usually
much lower than normal samples, which will have negative
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Fig. 3: Vessels’ trajectories extracted from AIS data.
TABLE I: The number of real and synthetic samples per class
Normal AIS-OOS anomaly Power outage
Real Real Synthetic Real Synthetic
2-class 129,470 1,875 132,352
3-class 129,470 1,725 141,048 150 123,152
effect on the learning process, we synthetically create more
anomaly samples by appending 236 (59 times 4) missing
values to the 4-D feature of each real AIS messages of vessels
in order to balance the number of samples per class in the
dataset. Similarly, for the 3-class model we first synthetically
generated AIS anomalies as in the 2-class model, and some
of which could be power outage samples. We then created
extra power outage samples by modifying the positions of
vessels with uniformly distributed random positions in the
regions away from Rostock, which is located at (longitude =
12.1◦, latitude = 54.1◦). Precisely, we selected two rectangular
areas with coordinates (long, lat in degrees) as [(11, 54), (11.4,
55)] and [(12.4, 54.4), (13, 55)], such that distances of these
artificial positions are more than the AIS transmission range,
i.e., 40 nautical miles. It is important to mention that the
AIS transmission range depends on the propagation condition,
atmospheric effect, antenna heights, transmission power, etc.
Nevertheless, it is generally considered as 40 nautical miles
under normal propagation condition, which we use it as a
threshold to define power outage samples among the anomaly
samples. Table I summarizes the number of real and synthetic
data samples for the normal, anomaly and power outage
classes in both the models.
In total, we collected 165,704 AIS messages from 228
stationary and moving vessels in the Baltic sea for three days
from the Rostock AIS base station. From these messages,
we use 132,352 messages of 133 vessels with speed more
than 3 knots to train and validate the ANN models, and data
of remaining vessels were kept aside for testing the model.
Note that not all real AIS messages forms real samples in the
dataset. The reason is that some messages (1007=132,352-
129,470-1875) overlaps with other real messages in the same
2 seconds resampling interval. In the 2-class model, the dataset
eventually has 129,470 normal samples and 134,227 anomaly
samples (which includes synthetically created anomalies). In
the 3-class model, the number of normal, anomaly and power
outage samples are 129,470, 142,773, and 123,302, respec-
tively. For both of these models, we randomly split the datasets
into training and validation purposes with the ratio 60:40. The
testing is also performed with data collected from vessels that
are not used in training.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we investigate the effectiveness of our neural
network-assisted anomaly detection framework in terms of
accuracy, loss, computation time, and a confusion matrix. A
confusion matrix is a performance measure of a classification
algorithm that shows the number of correct and incorrect
prediction of samples for each class. In a 2-class (normal
and anomaly) model, true positive (TP) rate is the probability
of correct detection of anomaly, and true negative (TN) rate
is the right recognition of the normal behavior. Therefore,
false positive (FP) rate is 1-TN, and false negative (FN) rate
is 1-TP. On the other hand, in a model with 3 or more
classes, one-vs-rest approach can be used to compute correct
and false prediction. The overall accuracy is defined as the
ratio of total number of correct predictions and total number
of input samples. We train and validate the ANN models
with 10 different seeds, which randomly splits the dataset
into 60:40 in each run. Thus, the accuracy presented on all
(ten times) validation samples. We use a Scikit-learn library’s
implementation of ANN and the default parameters provided
by it. The ANN is fully connected with one hidden layer with
100 neurons. We observe that increasing hidden layers does
not improve accuracy. We use a well-known Adam optimizer.
The learning rate is adaptive and starting learning rate is 0.001.
The convergence is considered to be reached when the loss
does not improve by at least the tolerance 10−5 for a certain
number of consecutive iterations. The threshold for defining
the anomaly in terms of fraction of missing data in a sample is
set to X = 0.9, i.e., 90%, which means an anomaly sample has
54 or more AIS 4-D feature vector missing after the first AIS
4-D feature vector. Unless otherwise stated, an output neuron
with the highest probability is defined as a predicted class.
Let us first investigate how well the ANN models have been
trained. Figure 4 illustrates the cross-entropy loss (i.e, error
in estimating the classes) of both 2-class and 3-class models
during the training process after each epoch (iteration). Note
that the lower loss refers to a better learned model, and we
can see that within 20 epochs the 2-class model reaches the
convergence, and the final loss is in the order of 10−5. This
means the 2-class model optimizes the model weights to its
near-optimal values and could estimate with higher accuracy
than the 3-class model. The loss in 3-class model takes more
number of epochs (70) to converge, and the final loss is in
the order of 10−3. It is also important to note that we run the
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Fig. 4: Losses during training of the ANN 2-class and 3-class models
are shown against the number of training epochs.
experiments on a commodity computer with a 2-core CPU, 8
GB RAM and Intel i7 processor, and the training times per
1000 samples of the 2-class and 3-class models are 0.24 and
3.18 seconds, respectively. The testing times per 1000 samples
in the 2-class and 3-class models are 0.004 and 0.12 second,
respectively. Thus, we can say that the ANN anomaly models
can be used in real time to monitor live maritime traffic to
detect anomalies.
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Fig. 5: A confusion matrix of normal and anomaly classes.
Next, we evaluate the performance of both the models in
terms of accuracy, which is computed with 10 different seeds.
Each run has different training (60%) and validation (40%)
data samples, and the accuracy is obtained on the validation
data samples. Figure 5 depicts the performance of the 2-
class ANN model in terms of a confusion matrix. We can
see that the model can correctly learn normal as well as
anomaly behavior of the vessels with an overall accuracy
(number of true predictions divided by number of samples) of
nearly 100%. Moreover, only 32 normal samples are falsely
predicted as anomaly samples, so FP is negligible, and FN (i.e.,
predicting anomaly as normal) is also negligible. In order to
distinguish the power outage and AIS on-off anomaly, Figure
6 shows the the confusion matrix obtained using the 3-class
ANN model. Interestingly, the 3-class model misclassifies
more data samples than the 2-class model. In particular, the
power outage samples misclassify its 4 and 441 samples as
normal and AIS-OOS anomaly, respectively. Similarly, 11 and
338 AIS-OOS anomaly samples are incorrectly classified as
normal and power outage samples, respectively. We observe
that the misclassification rate between power outage and AIS-
OOS anomaly classes is around 0.1%, which occur mainly
at the transmission range boundary (i.e., 40 nautical miles).
Nevertheless, it also achieves 99.9% accuracy. This shows
that our ML-assisted anomaly framework is able to learn the
distinction between the AIS OOS due to power outage and the
intentional ones.
Normal Power Outage AIS On-Off 
Normal 517647 46 57 
Power Outage 4 493130 441 
AIS On-Off 11 388 570456 
Predicted class 
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Fig. 6: A confusion matrix of normal, power outage, and AIS on-off
anomaly classes.
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Fig. 7: A vessel’s trajectory.
Finally, we evaluate the performance of both models on a
single vessel’s AIS data, which is not used in either training
or validation of the models. The trajectory formed by the
vessel’s AIS position (latitude and longitude) data is shown
in Figure 7. We can see the discontinuities in the trajectory
on both edges of the track. In fact, there are many missing
AIS data on both edges. In order to see the anomalies, in
Figure 8 we highlight coordinates where we expect anomalies
as defined in the trained ANN models. More precisely, the
anomaly coordinates are marked with plus sign where there is
no consecutive AIS data for more than 90% (108 seconds) of
observation period (120 seconds) after receiving the first AIS
data in each sample. The figure also illustrates the predicted
anomalies by the 2-class model. Figure 8 shows that the 2-
class anomaly model can correctly identify all anomalies.
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Fig. 8: Anomaly detection in a vessel’s trajectory.
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Fig. 9: Anomaly and power outage detection in a vessel’s trajectory.
As mentioned before, some of these anomalies might occur
due to power outages as the vessel move beyond the AIS
transmission reach. Therefore, we used the 3-class model to
predict normal, power outage and anomaly samples in Figure
9. We observe here that the model correctly classifies all three
classes, except that one expected power outage sample is
misclassified as an anomaly sample. The reason is that this
sample is around the boundary of AIS transmission reach.
However, this is not the case with another track, shown in
Figure 10. In contrast to the previous figure, here we observe
an instance where a power outage sample at the boundary
is correctly predicted. In order to see the correct and false
predictions in all the tracks whose AIS data were not used in
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Fig. 10: Anomaly and power outage detection in a vessel’s trajectory.
either training or validation, Figure 11 shows the confusion
matrix on new real AIS data from 71 vessels. As only a
negligible amount of misclassification occurs, we can say that
the 3-class model is able to learn the normal, power outage
and OOS anomaly characteristics from the AIS data.
Normal Power Outage AIS On-Off 
Normal 32401 4 2 
Power Outage 0 94 2 
AIS On-Off 0 1 555 
Predicted class 
Tr
u
e 
cl
as
s 
Fig. 11: A confusion matrix of normal, power outage, and AIS on-off
anomaly classes based on a new real dataset.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed a multi-class artificial neu-
ral network (ANN)-based anomaly detection framework to
classify intentional and non-intentional AIS on-off switching
anomaly. The multi-class anomaly model captures AIS mes-
sage dropouts due to channel effects and intentional one. We
utilized position, speed and course, and timing information
from real world AIS data for the training the multi-class
anomaly detection models. Our results show that the models
achieve around 99.9% overall accuracy, and misclassify only
a few samples. The anomaly detection framework is designed
in such a way that we can further classify the anomaly types,
for instance, anomaly when vessels are moored, make U-turns,
or enter into a restricted zone. For the future work, we would
apply our models to live maritime traffic scenarios.
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